JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The case dates back to 1973, when an EEOC Commissioner's Charge against Sears was filed, alleging discrimination by race, sex, and national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Over the next few years, the EEOC sought to resolve the charges through discussions with Sears, but no agreement was reached. In early 1977, the EEOC issued a Commission Decision that there was "reasonable cause" to believe Sears had discriminated against women and minorities in violation of Title VII. There followed renewed efforts to reach an out-of-court settlement, but in January 1979, the EEOC determined that conciliation efforts had failed, and the agency filed suit against Sears that October.12
pretations of women's relationship to work and the relative impormative action plans.x3 Sears did institute an affirmative action plan in 1974, the year after the original Commissioner's Charge was filed, requiring that in jobs where women and/or minorities were underutilized, one out of every two people hired be either female or a member of a minority group. However, the EEOC ultimately argued that in the period from 1973 to 1980, Sears continued to discriminate against women in hiring for commission sales jobs. 14 On 26 January 1979, the day the EEOC notified Sears of its "failure to conciliate" but before the government had filed suit against the company, Sears went on the offensive with a lawsuit of its own-a class action directed against the EEOC and nine other government agencies. The suit charged that "the myriad Federal anti-discrimination statutes and regulations" conflicted with one another and were impossible to comply with, and that government policies themselves had created "an unbalanced workforce dominated by white males." Through the GI Bill and other proveteran measures, Sears argued, government policy had "deprived" employers of "a pool of qualified minority and female applicants"; yet now the government was accusing them of race and sex discrimination. "Society has been unable to resolve the dilemma between protecting the traditional husband-wife family unit and encouraging the independence of women apart from the family," Sears complained, and it asked the court to require the federal government to issue uniform guidelines. 15 Sears's suit was thrown out of court a few months after it was filed. In the interim, however, it attracted a great deal of public attention. This was partly because of the suit's unprecedented line of argument. In addition, however, Sears was represented by Charles Morgan At that point the Times asked him what his priorities would be, and Morgan replied, "Look, I know who the 13th, 14th, and 15th
Amendments were intended for and that's still the priority. "17 Actually, the EEOC's charges against Sears included race as well as sex discrimination. In October 1979, five months after Sears's preemptive suit was dismissed, the EEOC filed five suits against Sears-a nationwide suit alleging sex discrimination and four separate suits alleging sex discrimination in hiring against blacks and Hispanics in specific Sears facilities.' 8 Morgan represented Sears in all five cases.
Several reports appeared in the press in August 1979 (two months before the suits were filed) that EEOC staff lawyers were questioning whether the government could win its case against Sears in court. These reports cited "a series of confidential memos" from the office of Issie L. Jenkins, the EEOC's acting general counsel, suggesting a change in the Sears litigation strategy. 19 Instead of a single case against Sears, Jenkins's office recommended filing several separate suits: one nationwide sex discrimination suit alleging bias in recruitment, hiring, promotion, pay, and other areas; a separate nationwide race discrimination suit alleging discriminatory failure to promote minorities; as well as local race bias suits alleging discrimination in hiring and layoffs at specific stores. The memos also suggested that the national sex discrimination case was the strongest of the group. 20 Because EEOC representatives are not permitted to comment on the leaked material, whether or how the agency's final litigation strategy was influenced by this advice is impossible to determine.2' But the suits filed in October 1979 did separate the sex and race cases, a strategy generally consistent with what Jenkins's office had reportedly suggested.22 A settlement was eventually reached in the race cases, while the nationwide sex discrimination case gradually wended its way through the court system until it finally went to trial in 1984. 23 The sex discrimination case involved three basic charges. The EEOC accused Sears of failing to hire female job applicants for commission sales positions on the same basis as male applicants, failing to promote female noncommission salespersons to commission sales positions on the same basis as males, and paying women in certain management-level job categories less than similarly situated men.24 The historical testimony of Rosenberg and KesslerHarris concerned only the commission sales issues, and so the charge of sex discrimination in pay for management employees will not be explored in detail here. The EEOC suit charged Sears with systematic discrimination against women; originally there were thirty-five individual charges of sex discrimination attached to it. But because most of these were not specifically relevant to the charges of hiring and promotion discrimination in commission sales or to the pay discrimination charge involving managers, the EEOC decided not to try the individual cases as part of its suit. One reason for this decision was that each individual case required detailed attention in its own right, which it would not get in this setting. Some of these cases are being pursued separately by the individuals involved. 25 The 1986 decision in the case emphasized the EEOC's failure to present any individual victims of discrimination as witnesses. 26 The EEOC, however, pointed out that testimony from a few individuals who believed they were victims of discrimination could do little to substantiate the charge of hiring discrimination because of the vast numbers of job applications Sears received and because in most cases an applicant who is not hired has no way of knowing the reason why.27 The absence of testimony from individual victims may have also reflected the EEOC's limited resources, which were enormously taxed by the Sears case as it was. The agency reportedly spent about $2.5 million on the protracted case, while Sears spent an estimated $20 million in legal fees.28 In any event, the EEOC's case against Sears concentrated on statistical evidence of discrimination.
The EEOC presented extensive evidence of disparities between the female proportion of commission sales hires and the female proportion of sales applicants. The EEOC conducted elaborate statistical analyses to determine whether "differences between male and female applicants in characteristics that might be associated with success" could explain the disparities between the proportion of women among sales applicants and the proportion hired in commission positions. The factors controlled for in the statistical analyses were job applied for, age, education, job type experience, product line experience, and commission product sales experience.31 This did reduce the disparities between expected and actual commission sales hires, but substantial and statistically significant disparities remained.32 The EEOC also presented detailed statistical evidence regarding promotions, documenting statistically significant disparities between the expected and actual proportions of women among employees promoted from noncommission to commission sales positions in the 1973-80 period, for both part-and full-time workers. 33 In support of its case that the statistical disparities were due to discrimination, the EEOC presented qualitative evidence of bias in Sears's hiring procedures along with the statistical data. In one of the EEOC memos leaked to the press in 1979, Acting General Counsel Issie L. Jenkins reportedly wrote that "in proving our case we intend to emphasize Sears's policy of allowing employment decisions to be dictated by the unguided subjective judgement of an essentially Anglo male supervisory workforce as the primary culpable aspect of the system."34 In the trial itself five years later, the EEOC sought to do precisely this in presenting evidence about Sears's hiring procedures.
In describing Sears's hiring process, the EEOC noted that anyone who appeared at a Sears personnel office indicating an interest in employment was given an application to fill out and was interviewed. Later, the applicant might be interviewed a second time, depending on the first interviewer's impressions and on whether there were vacancies to be filled. Hiring decisions were ultimately made by the store manager or personnel manager. The only docu- Personality, supported by adequate mental ability, is important in Big Ticket Selling. This is illustrated by the fact that the Big Ticket Salesman is active and has a lot of drive. The high level of activity is backed by considerable physical vigor. He has a liking for tools, likes work which requires physical energy, and carries much of this energy and drive over into his selling activities. This information resulted from studying the Active and Vigor Scores for many Big Ticket Salemen. These men also enjoy changing tasks frequently, and dislike work which requires them to remain at one task or activity for prolonged periods of time. They do not take chances unnecessarily but may, as their impulsive scores indicate, act somewhat impulsively.
Although the explicitly masculine pronouns were eliminated in the editions of the manual written from 1966 on, this description of commission sales jobs otherwise remained unchanged. 35 The Active and Vigor Scores referred to here are from the Thurstone Temperament Schedule, a test that Sears policy required each applicant for a sales position to take before she or he could be hired. The test measured seven dimensions of temperament. On six of them, there were few differences between female and male scores, but on the seventh, the Vigor scale, there were dramatic differences. The reason is evident from the twenty questions comprising the Vigor scale, which included the following: "Do you have a low-pitched voice?' "Do you swear often?' "Have you ever done any hunting?'" "Have you participated in wrestling?' "Have you participated in boxing?" "Have you played on a football team?' The EEOC presented evidence that Sears believed that "a woman who scored 9 on the Vigor scale would have the same behavior as a man who scored 14." But while the company's 1973 "Retail Testing Manual" set out different recommended Vigor scores for selecting women and men for many other jobs, it used the same standard for both sexes in its recommended scores for commission sales positions. According to the manual, a man scoring 14 would be considered to have a "best score," while a woman scoring 9 would be viewed as a poor risk-even though Sears believed their behavior would be the same. 36 The manual and test materials bolstered the EEOC's case, but the argument that Sears had discriminated against women in commission sales jobs relied primarily on establishing the existence of (1) statistical disparities between the female proportion of hires and promotions and the female proportion of the relevant pools of available workers and (2) highly subjective employment processes. On both counts, the EEOC cited Title VII case law in support of its position.37 Sears did not dispute the EEOC's presentation of information about the hiring process itself, although it did contend that "tests were a minor consideration in commission sales selection."38 The company also argued that the EEOC had to show that there was intentional discrimination against women ("disparate treatment") behind the statistical disparities.39 Sears's "voluntarily-assumed affirmative action efforts" were cited as evidence of "the lack of an intention to discriminate." Management, Sears claimed, had made "stringent affirmative action efforts to recruit and encourage women to take commission sales jobs."40 Sears also criticized the EEOC for not introducing testimony from victims of discrimination.41 Lawyer Charles Morgan went so far as to suggest that "there was no victim here [in this trial] except one, and that one victim is Sears, Roebuck and Company."42
The bulk of Sears's defense, however, was devoted to challenging the validity of the EEOC's statistical analysis. The company argued that the EEOC's comparison of the representation of women among nonhired job applicants and among persons actually hired into commission sales jobs was improper -it was "comparing apples to oranges."43 The proper comparison to make, Sears contended, was between the proportion of women among all sales applicants and among all (commission and noncommission) sales hires or between the female proportion of applicants who specifically indicated a preference for commission sales and the female proportion of commission sales hires.44 (However, Sears did not ask its job applicants if they specifically preferred commission sales positions.)
Sears's critique of the EEOC's statistical analysis primarily concerned the "assumption" that "male and female applicants were equally qualified for and interested in commission sales positions."45 On the contrary, Sears argued, there were fundamental differences between women's and men's qualifications and preferences, and women were generally less suited to selling on commission. Commission salespeople, for one thing, must be willing to take risks.46 And commission selling is highly skilled, specialized work, Sears contended.
The commission salesperson must be able to determine customers' needs and match those needs with the product, trading up to better merchandise when possible. This requires intimate familiarity with, and ability to operate and demonstrate, several models in a product line, and frequently several product lines.... The commission salesperson must be able to face and meet objections, and must be willing to risk rejection and failure by attempting to "close" the sale -asking for the order at the earliest possible time and repeatedly until the sale is closed. ...
Although virtually all noncommission sales jobs can be filled by a sociable person with a pleasant, helpful personality and a reasonable ability to communicate and learn about relatively simple lines of merchandise, the combination of technical skills and specific personal characteristics found in effective commission salespersons distinguishes the latter as an elite among retail salespeople....
One of the most important personal qualities a commission salesperson must possess may be variously described as aggressiveness, desire, "hunger," or more generally, motivation.47 Sears argued that the EEOC's "assumption" that women and men in the applicant pool had similar qualifications and preferences for this work was "incredible on its face." Actually, the EEOC's statistical analysis controlled for certain factors which might legitimately influence the distribution of jobs between men and women-such as age, experience, and education. But Sears claimed that even with these "adjustments," the EEOC had "grossly overestimated female availability for commission sales." In the end, Sears argued, "the reasonableness of the EEOC's a priori assumptions of male/female sameness with respect to preferences, interests, and qualifications is.. .the crux of the issue."48 Sears presented a series of witnesses from its own personnel operations who testified that "far more men than women. . .were interested in and willing to accept commission sales jobs." Some Sears managers even testified "that they had interviewed every woman in the store and found not one who was willing to sell big ticket merchandise." Women were generally not interested in commission sales jobs, Sears sought to persuade the court, because of their (1) fear or dislike of the competitive, "dog-eat-dog" atmosphere of most commission sales divisions; (2) discomfort or unfamiliarity with most product lines sold on commission . .; (3) fear of being unable to compete, being unsuccessful and losing their jobs; (4) fear of nonacceptance by customers in such traditionally male-oriented divisions as hardware, automotive, installed home improvements, and tires; (5) distaste for the type of selling they believed was required in commission divisions; (6) preference for noncommission sales jobs; (7) preference for '"keeping busy" and dislike of the relatively slower customer traffic in most commission divisions; (8) the overall belief that the increased earnings potential of commission selling was not worth the additional responsibilities, problems, pressure, and uncertainty.49
According to Sears, then, the underrepresentation of women among commission salespersons was due not to discrimination but to women's own preferences. In his summation, lawyer Charles Morgan ridiculed the very idea of sex discrimination. "Strange, isn't it," the former civil rights advocate suggested, "that we live in a world where there is supposed to be a monopsony of white men who somehow get up every morning trying to find a way to discriminate against their wives, their daughters, their mothers, their sisters."50
To buttress its claim that most women are not interested in commission sales jobs, Sears introduced historical evidence into the case through the testimony of Rosalind Rosenberg. Sears asked other experts in women's history to testify in its behalf, but Rosenberg was the only one who accepted the invitation. Both Kathryn Kish Sklar and Carl Degler declined, and later both criticized Sears's use of historical evidence in the trial.51 Rosenberg says she accepted the job because she thought that the EEOC's case against Sears was weak and the assumptions of the statisticians were untenable. In addition, she has acknowledged that the fact that her ex-husband works for Morgan Associates, the law firm which represented Sears, may have played a role. 52 Rosenberg's testimony marshaled evidence from the literature in U.S. women's history to challenge the "assumption that women and men have identical interests and aspirations regarding work." Citing the work of dozens of prominent scholars in the field (including Degler, Sklar, and Kessler-Harris herself), Rosenberg sought to persuade the court that "many workers, especially women, have goals and values other than realizing maximum economic gain."53 Her sketch of the history of the sexual division of labor in the United States assigned great weight to women's distinctive values and interests. "Throughout American history," Rosenberg's "Offer of Proof" stated, "there has been a consensus, shared by women, that, for women, working outside the home is subordinate to family needs." As evidence for this, she cited hostility to married women's employment in the Depression, the reluctance of the government to provide childcare during World War II, and the unequal distribution of household labor between the sexes today, concluding that "many women choose jobs that complement their family obligation over jobs that might increase and inhance [sic] their earnings potential."" Although most of Rosenberg's testimony consisted of general statements about women and work, a few points related more directly to Sears's specific contentions in this case. '"Women tend to be more interested than men in the cooperative, social aspects of the work situation," her "Offer of Proof" asserts. "Men's more extensive experience in competitive sports," on the other hand, "prepares them for the competitiveness, aggressiveness, teamwork, and leadership required for many jobs." 55 Rosenberg testified that the EEOC's statistician "assumes that given equal opportunity women will make the same choices that a man would make. And yet that assumption is based on a traditionally male model of how people behave in the universe, that is, the most important thing is economic maximization. We believe as feminist scholars we have a responsibility not to allow our scholarship to be used against the interests of women struggling for equity in our society. 78 The resolution did not name Rosenberg directly, but it clearly expressed the concern of other feminist scholars about her role in the Sears case.
Rosenberg, however, has steadfastly defended her actions, writing letters to various publications which have covered the controversy as well as an Op-Ed piece in the New York Times.79 She told the Women and Society Seminar:
I realize that many people disagree with my view of scholarly responsibility and believe that I showed poor political judgment in deciding to testify, that I played into the hands of conservatives, and that my testimony, if successful, will leave large companies free to discriminate against women. I reject the view that scholarship should be subordinated to political goals. But even if I were to accept that view, I would still feel justified in having testified in this case, because I think that Sears has advanced women's interests, whereas the position taken by the EEOC in this case has not."0 Sears had advanced women's interests, Rosenberg believes, through its affirmative action plan which, starting in 1974, required that 50 percent of commission sales jobs go either to women or to minority males. "I believe the evidence shows not only that Sears was not discriminating against women but that it was successfully recruiting women into nontraditional jobs through a vigorous affirmative action program,"she wrote.81 Rosenberg was also influenced by the fact that the EEOC's case did not include direct testimony from women who were victims of Sears's discrimination. "I said in the beginning, 'If there's ever a complainant in this case, I'm not going to testify,'" Rosenberg recalled in an interview, "which strikes me in retrospect as a little bit crazy. ...
[But] for me, symbolically, the absence of complainants was critical." 82 Another factor that induced Rosenberg to testify was that she genuinely believed that the EEOC's case was based on a faulty assumption, namely, "that men and women applying for sales positions at Sears were equally interested in commission sales."83 She was not asked to testify as to Sears's "guilt or innocence," she insists. "I was simply asked to determine, from a historical point of view, whether the assumption on which the EEOC had built its case made sense. Important as the use of historical evidence was in this case, it seems likely that even without Rosenberg's testimony, Sears would have won. The odds were heavily stacked in the giant retailer's favor. The EEOCs top official, Clarence Thomas, had publicly proclaimed his negative view of statistical evidence and his desire to lose the case. Sears spent eight times as much money as did the EEOC on legal work.93 The judge was appointed by the Reagan administration, which has repeatedly proclaimed its opposition to affirmative action. As long as this is the political context in which we find ourselves, feminist scholars must be aware of the real danger that arguments about "difference" or "women's culture" will be put to uses other than those for which they were originally developed. That does not mean we must abandon these arguments or the intellectual terrain they have opened up; it does mean that we must be self-conscious in our formulations, keeping firmly in view the ways in which our work can be exploited politically. 21. An EEOC representative told me this in a telephone conversation on 13 January 1986. I also learned in this conversation that the reports of the leaked EEOC memos were ruled "inadmissible" as evidence during the 1985 trial. 22. As noted above, ultimately the EEOC filed a nationwide sex discrimination suit against Sears and four separate race discrimination suits involving specific facilities but no nationwide race discrimination suit. See 
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